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Financial Risk Management
Alternatives in a Whole-Farm
Setting
Glenn D.  Pederson and Diane Bertelsen
Risk programming  and simulation  methods are used to analyze the opportunity to
reduce whole-farm  risk in a diversified cash crop farm  through reduced leverage  and/
or adjustments in rental arrangements.  These two financial  strategies are shown to
extend the ability of the farm operator  to manage downside risk beyond the singular
effects of a diversified  farm plan. The analysis  indicates that a trade-off occurs
between these strategies, but that the reduction of debt has a greater impact on the
distributions of net cash flow (before taxes) and outstanding term debt.
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Developments  in the farm  sector during the
past decade have heightened interest in whole-
farm risk management  strategies.  Current and
projected  farm  economic  and  financial  con-
ditions also dictate that an increasing number
of farm  managers  must  develop,  and  effec-
tively implement,  risk management  strategies
which  integrate  existing alternatives  for risk
control. Interactions between operations of the
farm and the financing of the farm are of stra-
tegic  importance  and  merit  additional  theo-
retical and applied research.
Farm planning  under  risk  has  been inves-
tigated using risk  programming  and carefully
defined subsets of decision variables (Johnson
and Boehlje; Musser and Stamoulis;  Mapp et
al.). Other mathematical programming studies
have  attempted  to model  dynamic  behavior
by incorporating  sequential  decision  making
and flexible strategies in the context of the farm
planning problem (King and Oamek). Less so-
phisticated  approaches  to whole-farm  finan-
cial risk management have also been suggested
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as mechanisms which farm managers can im-
plement effectively  (Eidman  1985).
The objective of  this paper is to demonstrate
that an important strategic trade-off exists be-
tween  the adoption  of flexible  strategies  and
the option of reducing the level of fixed finan-
cial obligations  in managing  downside  finan-
cial  risk of the farm  business.1 The  flexible
strategy which  will be investigated  is a crop-
share rental  arrangement  for cropland  as op-
posed  to  a  fixed-cash  rental  arrangement.
Whole-farm  risk  management  concepts  and
model considerations are discussed. A  safety-
first, risk-programming model is developed to
identify risk-efficient  farm  plans.  A partially
stochastic simulation is then used to illustrate
the  financial  risk  characteristics  of  optimal
strategic decisions for two representative  farm
ownership  positions.
Risk Management  Concepts
Risk management refers here to the selection
of action  alternatives which  alter exposure to
the financial consequences of variability in farm
earnings.  Whole-farm  risk  management  in-
Strategic  refers to management decisions  and practices  which
position the firm to control exposure to risk in a long-run  context,
as opposed to those which focus on  control of annual (short-run)
risk.
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volves  recognition  of diversifiable  and  non-
diversifiable  risks.  Diversifiable  risks include
those  sources  of risk which  can  be  managed
through enterprise  selection or other produc-
tion and market  management  practices.  The
objective  of diversification  is to combine  ac-
tivities  which  display  negative,  zero,  or  low
positive covariance  of returns. Previous stud-
ies show that opportunities  for diversification
are  often  limited  by  resources,  climate,  and
accessible markets  (Sonka and Patrick). Non-
diversifiable risks include those sources of risk
which are not amenable to farm-level produc-
tion  organization  and  market  management.
Their  farm-level  consequences  may,  or  may
not,  be  modified  by  financial  management
strategies  which  attempt  to  increase  the  ca-
pacity of the farm to absorb the consequences
of risk.
The extended portfolio  model suggested by
Barry  provides  an  integrated  conceptual
framework  for  evaluating  the  optimal  orga-
nization of farm assets and liabilities for risk-
averse decision makers.  The basic  concept of
the extended portfolio model is that total farm
risk (TR) is equal to the product of farm busi-
ness risk (BR), and financial  risk (FR) which
is attributable  to leverage.
(1) TR  = BR-FR.
Financial  risk  is  derived  from  the multipli-
cative relationship in equation (1) by defining
total risk as the coefficient  of variation of eq-
uity and business risk as the coefficient of  vari-
ation on risky assets.2 Simplifying the resulting
financial risk  components  and  substituting  it
back into equation (1), the expanded total farm
risk expression is shown in equation  (2).
(2) TR  = Sa  raa
ra  raa - idPd
where  Sa is the standard deviation of return to
the risky assets,  ra is the expected return to the
risky assets, i  is the interest rate on debt (ini-
tially, a risk-free asset), Pa is the proportion  of
2 The simplified expression for financial risk (as shown by Barry,
p.  120) is derived from
FR = TR/BR
SaPa  SI  /  Sa
rapa - idPd  ra
raPa
rapa - idPd
risky assets in the portfolio, and pd is the pro-
portion of the risk-free asset (debt) in the port-
folio.
The  important  feature  of the total  risk re-
lationship is that percentage increases in busi-
ness risk are expanded by percentage increases
in  financial  risk  through  increased  leverage.
Since variability  of returns to  assets  (Sa)  and
the  index  of financial  leverage  (pd)  are  both
positively related to the level of total farm risk,
a  strategic  trade-off  could  occur  between  fi-
nancial management  strategies which  modify
business risk  exposure and scale  adjustments
in leverage.  An  additional  observation  con-
cerning the above model is that total farm risk
can be analyzed using either net operating in-
come or net cash flows  (Eidman 1983).
The extended portfolio model could be em-
ployed to derive an optimum set of farm plans
based  on  a farmer's  risk-return  preferences,
expected  level  and  variability  of returns  on
assets, expected level and variability of  the cost
of borrowing, correlations between returns and
costs  for  assets  and  liabilities,  and  financial
structure  of assets  and  liabilities.  While  the
portfolio model approach is theoretically use-
ful,  modeling  of farm-level  portfolio  adjust-
ments has not occurred.3
A portfolio  model (of the type identified) is
not easily  adapted  to  all  contexts  of whole-
farm risk analysis.  Risk management  models
require  that risk measures  and  risk  concepts
correspond.  Variability  of returns  has  been
generally accepted as a measure of  risk because
of its theoretical relationship with the expected
utility  hypothesis.  Less  widely  accepted  has
been the approach of reducing  the probability
of  disaster  events  (safety-first),  where  risk-
averse farmers perceive the risk of an adverse
event as inseparable from its likelihood of oc-
currence (Helmers). However, a safety-first ap-
proach  provides  a more appropriate  method
for analyzing risk responses of decision makers
concerned with farm liquidity and survival.
Barry's conceptual model allows one to iden-
tify the underlying trade-offs, yet the modeling
of those relationships in a farm  financial sur-
vival context are best handled using a safety-
3  Barry suggested that farm-level portfolio adjustments have not
received much attention in theoretical or empirical analysis since
the questions  are largely  empirical.  Decisions  to make  portfolio
revisions depend  heavily on  characteristics  of farmers and  their
farming operations,  market conditions,  and responses  of lenders.
Robison and Brake concluded that portfolio models are generally
more  applicable  as  a  tool of financial  analysis  than  as  a  farm
planning tool.
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first  approach.  A  safety-first  model  can
incorporate variations in liquid assets (or cash
demands)  into  a  farm  financial  management
model  as  a constraint.  By  setting the  target
level of income at a level which guarantees the
liquidity needs of  the farm business and house-
hold will be met, acceptable limits of financial
risk bound the feasible  range of risk manage-
ment alternatives.  It is in this capacity to limit
the feasible set of admissible risk management
activities  that  safety-first  models  provide  a
useful  mechanism  for evaluating  whole-farm
risk management alternatives.
Strategic management of whole-farm risk (as
conceptualized  here)  involves  diversification
and the adoption of flexible strategies. Flexible
strategies  include  alternatives  which  modify
the consequences of risk when faced with fixed
farm business  and household  financial  com-
mitments. These strategies may be represented
by choices  which  make the pattern  of future
actions  contingent upon  future events.  Alter-
natively,  a  flexible  strategy  may involve  the
establishment  of  contracts  which  automati-
cally modify the financial consequences of fu-
ture events. Examples of this type of flexibility
option are found in crop-share and related flex-
ible  rental  arrangements.4 Another  example
would  be  the  use  of variable  amortization
schemes  through which the farmer's debt ser-
vice obligation  is made contingent  on his an-
nual income level.
The strategic alternative to adoption of flex-
ible  strategies  is to  reduce  the  level  of fixed
financial  commitments  by reducing  financial
leverage.  Farm managers  with relatively high
fixed financial obligations would find it to their
advantage  to  adopt  flexible  strategies  which
reduce  the probability  and  magnitude  of ad-
verse  financial impacts due to price, yield, or
cost fluctuations.  When flexible  strategies are
either  not  feasible  or  unavailable,  the  farm
manager  would  improve  financial  perfor-
mance and survivability by reducing the scale
of fixed obligations.
Risk Programming Model
A Target MOTAD  model  was developed  for
a cash  crop farm  located  in southeast North
4 Land rental  arrangements  which  allow for  risk  sharing have
been analyzed  in terms of their effectiveness  under various  crop-
ping plans and crop  rotations (Apland, Barnes,  and Justus;  Ped-
erson; Perry,  Rister, and Richardson). The efficient rental strategy
was sensitive to risk preferences  in each  situation analyzed.
Dakota (Bertelsen).  The farmer  produced  six
crops  (wheat,  barley,  corn,  sunflowers,  soy-
beans, and sugarbeets) on 2,000 acres (860 acres
owned and  1,140 acres rented). Forty possible
activities were  specified  in the model to  cap-
ture the range of diversified plans available to
the farmer.  Six crops could be grown on own
or rented land, with (or without) participation
in government  farm programs,  and  with  (or
without)  purchase  of multiple  peril  crop  in-
surance. The farmer provided estimates of the
actual mean, maximum, and minimum prices
and yields from farming experience during the
period  1980-84. 5 Based  on  these  subjective
price  and  yield  parameters,  distributions  of
farm earnings net of cash production costs were
generated  for each activity.
A quasi-random  sample  of fifty  price  and
yield observations was generated for each crop
using  a multivariate  beta  distribution-gener-
ating algorithm  (Parsch) and correlations  de-
rived from  secondary,  county-level  data.6 Pa-
rameters  of  the  specified  price  and  yield
distributions  are shown in table  1. Sunflowers
exhibited relatively higher price variability and
relatively  lower  yield  variability  than  other
crops and displayed negative skewness of  prices
and yields.  Most crops illustrated  greater rel-
ative  yield  variability  than price  variability.
Wheat,  barley,  and  corn  yield  distributions
were most negatively  skewed.
Sunflowers  and  sugarbeets  represent  the
highest return crops in the farm plan. Produc-
tion costs were estimated from  1982 farm ex-
pense records.  Sugarbeet cash costs were high-
est ($235.65/acre)  and barley cash costs  were
the lowest ($82.58/acre).
Net cash operating income per acre for each
activity  was  computed as  shown  in equation
(3).
(3)  NCOIi =  (pijy  - vcj  - r,-  pmJ
+ im, + dJ)aj - (1 - a,)cc
where  pij is the ith price  observation  of crop
j; Yi,  ith yield observation of crop j; vcj, vari-
5Use  of historical prices and yields  for planning purposes has
obvious limitations  which  are  well-recognized  in the  farm  risk
management literature.  Historical estimates  are used in this anal-
ysis to represent  farm-level  experiences  and to illustrate the risk
management issues.
6 The multivariate beta distribution allows generated crop price
and yield series to reflect intercorrelation due to market or growing
conditions. The beta distribution also allows for flexibility in sim-
ulating distributions  of crop  yields  which  were  observed  to  be
asymmetric about the mean.
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Table 1.  Parameters of Generated Price and Yield Distributions for a Southeast North Dakota
Cash Crop Farm
Crop  Unit  Mean  Minimum  Maximum  Variance  C.V.  Skewness
-..------  ...----  .....--...--.-------.----.-----  (prices received/unit)  -------------------------------------------------------
Wheat  bu  $ 3.77  $ 2.99  $  4.40  .10  .084  -. 03
Barley  bu  2.38  1.57  3.40  .16  .168  .01
Corn  bu  2.75  2.09  3.28  .07  .096  .0
Soybeans  bu  6.00  4.50  8.25  .56  .125  .01
Sunflower  cwt  13.00  7.00  20.50  9.00  .231  -2.06
Sugarbeets  ton  32.00  24.50  41.40  14.10  .117  2.85
..................................  . .............-....-.  .. (yields/acre)  -------  ---------  ------------
Wheat  bu  38.3  22.8  50.8  39.1  .163  -14.68
Barley  bu  53.3  25.2  78.3  156.0  .234  -27.99
Corn  bu  80.0  46.3  110.0  225.0  .188  -12.27
Soybeans  bu  25.0  13.0  38.5  36.0  .240  -7.01
Sunflower  cwt  15.6  8.8  21.6  9.0  .192  -. 09
Sugarbeets  ton  15.4  14.1  6.95  22.9  .311  -5.11
able  cash  cost of producing  crop  j;  ri,  land
charge for rental land; pmj, crop insurance pre-
mium  for  crop j; imi,  indemnity  received  if
the  ith yield observation is less than the guar-
anteed yield of crop j; d,, deficiency payment
received if  the ith price observation is less than
the target  price;  aj,  fraction  of total  acreage
devoted  to crop j  that is  actually  planted to
comply with government program provisions;
and cc, conserving  cost for set-aside  acreage.
The individual  yield coverage  option in crop
insurance  was  specified  at the 75% yield and
medium price election levels according to ac-
tuarial  tables for the area.  Alternative  rental
arrangements were specified according to com-
mon  practice  in the  region.  Share  leases  are
typically one-third, two-third arrangements to
the landlord  and tenant,  respectively.  Sugar-
beet acres are typically rented on a cash basis.
However,  average  sugarbeet  cash rents  were
found to  be  equivalent  to  a  one-sixth,  five-
sixth'share  arrangement,  assuming no sharing
of cash expenses.  In this analysis the tenant is
assumed to pay all variable cash expenses un-
der the  share  agreements.  Cropland is rented
for $52.50  per acre  under fixed cash arrange-
ments.
The Target MOTAD  model  is specified  (in
vector notation)  as7
(4) max E(R)X = RX
subject to
7  The Target  MOTAD programming  model  specified is of the





AX  <  B
RX+  d-  > T
Pd-  D
X, d-  >  0
where X is an n  x  1 vector of activity levels;
R,  1 x  n vector of expected returns  for each
activity;  A,  k  x  n vector of resource require-
ments; B, k  x  1  vector of resource constraints;
T,  m  x  1 vector with  each  element equal  to
the target; R, m  x  n matrix of returns for each
activity; d-, m x  1 vector of negative devia-
tions from target;  P, 1 x  m vector of proba-
bilities  for  each  observation;  D, a  scalar pa-
rameterized  from zero to a large number;  n =
number  of activities;  m = number  of obser-
vations;  k = number of constraints.
Equation  (4) is the objective function of the
linear programming model. Activity levels are
found which  maximize  total  expected return
and  satisfy  the  constraints  of equations  (5)
through  (8).  Equation  (5) represents  the  re-
source  constraints  on  activity  levels.  Devia-
tions of returns below target  are computed in
equation (6). The probability-weighted  sum of
deviations is computed in equation (7)  where
the risk  constraint,  D, is imposed.  A  Target
MOTAD risk-efficient set is derived by param-
eterizing the risk constraint.
The  row elements  in  each  column  of the
R-matrix  in  equation  (6)  form  the distribu-
tions of net returns.  Fifty price  and yield ob-
servations  for each  crop  are  generated  by  a
computer  program  and  used  in  subsequent
computations  of net returns.  Therefore,  each
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Table 2.  Optimal Crop Activities  for Two  Levels  of Ownership and Two  Rental Alternatives
Cash  Share  Cash  Share
Crop Activity  Owned  Rented  Owned  Rented  Owned  Rented  Owned  Rented
...................-..........--...-...---------  - -----..--  -------.------  (acres)  --------------------------------------------------  ------
Wheata  0  0  0  140  0  0  0  500
Barleya  0  300  0  700  0  300  0  700
Corna  360  540  360  0  0  900  0  0
Sunflower  200  0  200  0  200  0  130  70
Sugarbeets  300  0  0  0  230  70  0  0
Sugarbeetsb  0  0  300  0  0  0  300  0
Total acres owned  860  860  430  430
Total acres rented  840  840  1,270  1,270
Expected return  $138,800  $136,700  $117,500  $112,200
Expected deviation below targetd  $22,000  $17,500  $16,500  $10,000
a Crop was produced under participation  in the  1982 farm program.
b Crop was insured through  purchase of federal,  all-risk crop insurance.
cExpected  total net cash operating income.
d  Expected deviation  below target income.
net return  observation  is  equally  likely  and
each element  of the P-vector in equation  (6)
is given a probability weight equal to  1/50.
Various expense  items were  used to deter-
mine target income levels. Interest expense on
term debt, family living expense,  property tax
on owned farmland,  and insurance  on build-
ings and machinery  are all considered  as ele-
ments of the target level of return. Interest on
term  debt  averages  8%  of intermediate  plus
long-term  debt. Annual family living expense
is set initially at $15,000. The combined target
income level  is $115,000  when  860 acres  are
owned.  Because  of reduction  in debt  service
costs and property taxes, the target income level
declines to $75,000 when 430 acres are owned.
These two ownership levels were analyzed us-
ing Target MOTAD.
Optimal activity levels and whole-farm risk
and return estimates are shown in table 2. Ex-
pected  cash operating  income  is lower  when
430  acres  are  owned  under  both  rental  ar-
rangements  since  the land  charge  on  owned
land is not deducted. Interest payments on long-
term (real estate) mortgages are included in the
target.  This partially  explains  the  larger  ex-
pected deviations below target in the 860-acre
model. The expected deviation below target is
$5,500  less  in the  430-acre  cash  rent model
(than in the 860-acre cash rent model) because
the target is lower.  The difference  in expected
deviation below target with share rent ($7,500)
results from both the change in target income
level  and  number  of acres  rented.  Expected
return and downside risk are lower with share
renting  than  with  fixed  cash  renting,  as  ex-
pected.  Share  leases reduce  expected  income
because above-average returns are shared with
the  landowner.  However,  deviations  below
target are smaller under the share arrangement
because the cost of rented land decreases when
returns are below average.
Crops with high expected returns (sunflower
and  sugarbeets)  are  optimal  on owned  land.
Total sunflower acreage is limited to 200 acres
to  reflect  rotation  requirements.  Sugarbeet
acreage  is constrained  at  300  acres,  which  is
the number of contract  acres owned in  1982.
Production of corn with government  program
participation is optimal with fixed cash leases
but not with crop share. Wheat and barley pro-
duction under  the farm program  are optimal
only  with share  rent.  Wheat  and  barley  are
lower  return crops  and  it  is  optimal  for the
renter to  share  the risk of below-average  re-
turns with the landowner.
Simulation Model
Risk-efficient strategies derived from the Tar-
get MOTAD  models were simulated to mon-
itor farm financial performance  within a par-
tially  stochastic  framework.  The  simulation
model captures the  cash flow performance  of
each strategy for five years from  1980 through
1984. Simulated  distributions were generated
for three performance variables; before-tax net
cash flow (NCBT), principal payments (PPMT),
and end-of-period  term debt level (TDEBT).
Computations  are  summarized  in  equations
(9)-(1  ).
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(9)  NCBTk,,  = NCOIk,  - r(TDEBTk_ ,i)
- OC - FAMk - PPMTki;
(10)  PPMTk, = O.10(TDEBTk_,-)
if 2,000  >  NCBTk, >  0,
= O.10(TDEBTk_  ,  + NCBTk,
if NCBTk,  < 0,
=  0.10(TDEBTk,_,)  + NCBTki
- 2,000  ifNCBTki > 2,000;
(11)  TDEBTkJ = TDEBTk_  ,, - PPMTk,
where k =  1, ... ,  5 and i  =  1, ... ,  50.  Five
annual  distributions  each  with  fifty  observa-
tions of NCBT are composed of NCOI obser-
vations  minus interest  on existing term  debt
(interest rate,  r, is fixed at 8%),  insurance  and
property  tax  (OC), family  living  expense
(FAM), and scheduled principal payments. No
new  debt-financed  purchases  of land  or  ma-
chinery are allowed in the simulation.
Scheduled  principal payments are assumed
to be  10%  of the previous year-ending  term
debt. This simple repayment plan is adequate
in a five-year simulation model, although term
debt  could  not be  reduced  to  zero  over  any
finite time period according to this plan (even
with NCBT always  positive). Actual principal
payments may differ from the scheduled pay-
ment. If NCOI is not adequate to meet fixed
obligations,  NCBT  becomes  negative  and
PPMT  is less than  10% of existing TDEBT. If
NCBT is negative and greater in absolute value
than scheduled PPMT, then actual  PPMT is
negative  (i.e.,  additional  term funds  are bor-
rowed).8 Prepayment  of term debt can  occur
if NCBT is positive and greater than  $2,000,
which is incorporated as a cash buffer for con-
tingencies.
Four simulation models were specified. The
860-owned-acre  model was run assuming cash
costs of production increase with the Index of
Prices  Paid  by  Farmers  in  each  year  and
assuming no prepayment of term debt (model
860A).  The  430-owned-acre  model  was  run
using identical assumptions  (model 430A).  A
8 For example, if the resulting NCBT is  negative  $500 and the
scheduled principal payment was $1,000,  actual PPMT  is reduced
to $500  and the unpaid part is  reamortized. If NCBT is negative
$1,500 and the scheduled principal payment is $1,000, additional
borrowing of $500  would  occur, since the full principal payment
was subtracted to determine the annual NCBT amount. This pro-
cedure is qualitatively different from a one-year debt deferral used
by some agricultural lenders, but does represent a consistent meth-
od for dealing with  nonrepayment in the simulation  model.
second pair of simulations were run assuming
prepayment  of term debt  could  occur in any
given year (models  860B  and  430B).  Family
living expenses were indexed to the consumer
price index in all four simulations.
The generated  price and yield sample series
of fifty draws used in development of the Tar-
get MOTAD  farm  plans  is used  to  simulate
financial  performance.  Government  program
provisions,  crop  insurance  parameters,  and
property tax rates and insurance premiums re-
mained  unchanged in the simulation.
Simulation Results
Financial performance of the farm in year five
is reported in table 3, assuming no prepayment
of term debt. In each farm ownership position
mean NCOI was  somewhat  higher under  the
crop-share  arrangement.  The  important  dif-
ferences  between  rental  options  are  visible
through  a  comparison  of the  maximum  and
minimum  values  of  NCOI (holding  owned
acres constant). Net cash operating income il-
lustrates greater downside variability with fixed
cash rent as  reflected  by the  larger semivari-
ance  and minimum  income  levels. This pat-
tern  of variability  is also  reflected by NCBT
(which is computed using scheduled principal
payments) and somewhat differently by PPMT
(actual principal payments).
Expected NCBT increased (became less neg-
ative) under both rental options, as initial term
debt  was  reduced  with  the  level  of owned
acreage.  Negative expected annual NCBT es-
timates indicate that net cash income was not
adequate both to service debt and to meet in-
creasing family  cash  withdrawals.  As  a  con-
sequence,  expected  principal  payments  are
negative, indicating that additional borrowing
occurred.
Comparison  of PPMT at the high  and low
leverage  positions  indicates  that  the magni-
tude  of additional  borrowing  by  year  five  is
significantly  reduced  by  scaling  back  debt.
There is a significant additional  advantage  to
shifting  to crop  share  rental  arrangements  at
the lower debt level.  Expected and minimum
PPMT are less negative and the semivariance
is  reduced  under  crop  share  rent  when  430
acres are owned and the balance of  total acreage
is rented.
Expected,  end-of-period  term debt in year
five is above the initial term debt level in three
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Table  3.  Simulated  Financial  Performance (in Year  Five)  for Two  Farm Ownership Levels
and Rental Arrangements with No  Prepayment of Debt
Fixed Cash  Crop Share
NCOI  NCBT  PPMT  TDEBT  NCOI  NCBT  PPMT  TDEBT
. ...  . ...................................................................------------------------------------  ($  thou .) -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Model 860A
Mean  93.7  -131.2  -32.5  1,088.9  98.7  -122.9  -22.8  1,061.4
S.V.a  3,454.2  10,871.6  5,652.2  107,688.0
b 2,214.8  7,092.4  3,786.4  71,874.0
b
Minimum  -89.0  -458.2  -272.4  613.0  39.6  -371.6  -206.5  613.0
Maximum  249.6  92.3  70.8  2,130.6  227.1  69.8  71.2  1,858.4
Model 430A
Mean  72.3  -59.4  -24.7  563.5  79.2  -44.5  -8.0  502.2
S.V.a  3,388.2  9,212.4  4,214.4  76,350.0b  1,688.8  4,754.5  2,171.5  40,886.7b
Minimum  -106.0  -365.0  -240.4  314.1  -40.4  -251.0  -153.3  314.1
Maximum  228.0  130.5  34.9  1,486.4  203.2  105.7  35.3  1,131.0
a  Semivariance estimate for  observations below the mean, i.e.,  sum of squared negative  deviations from  the mean.
b Semivariance  estimate on  term debt is  the  positive semivariance,  i.e.,  sum of squared  positive deviations  from the  mean. Positive
semivariance  corresponds  to the greater  financial risk at  debt levels above the mean.
of the  four  situations.  Initial  term  (interme-
diate  and  long-term)  debt  was  $532,000  in
models  430A  and  430B,  and  $1,038,200  in
models 860A and 860B. Only the low leverage
situation  with  crop  share  renting  shows  pro-
gress in reducing the expected term debt load.
In  addition,  the  positive  semivariance  of
TDEBT is reduced through share renting. The
high  leverage,  fixed  cash  rent  option  poten-
tially results in a doubling of term debt by year
five,  as indicated  by the  maximum  TDEBT
estimate.  Since  prepayment  was  not allowed
in this set of simulations,  the potential for  fi-
nancial progress through early debt retirement
under a fixed cash arrangement is not reflected.
The  assumption  of restricted  debt  repay-
ment was relaxed,  allowing for prepayment to
occur  after a cash buffer of $2,000 had  been
attained. 9 Simulation results  are contained in
table 4. Financial performance  under the fixed
cash arrangements  was changed dramatically.
Prepayment  of debt  increased  maximum
NCBT and reduced  the semivariance  in both
the high and low leverage  models under both
rental options.  Expected principal payment in
year five was higher  (less negative)  indicating
less borrowing because of prepayment  in ear-
lier years.  The most dramatic increases  in ex-
pected PPMT  occurred in the low leverage sit-
9  The cash buffer was required to meet anticipated cash expenses,
such as income taxes  (which would likely  occur if earnings were
sufficiently higher to allow additional debt payments to occur) and
family-living  cash contingencies.  The  choice  between  prepaying
principal and other financial  options is a more  complex  question
which is not addressed in this analysis.
uations. Interestingly, the semivariances in year
five generally increased as a result of allowing
prepayment of debt. Progress toward expected
repayment  of term  debt  occurred  with  both
rental arrangements  at the  low leverage  posi-
tion, as reflected by the reduction in expected
TDEBT below the initial level.  However,  the
expected TDEBT levels at the end of year five
were above initial term debt,  indicating a de-
terioration  of the debt position in both high-
leverage situations. Allowance for prepayment
of debt reduced  expected  TDEBT in the  low
leverage situation  to a greater  extent, but the
semivariance of TDEBT increased more in the
low  leverage  position.  Improvements  in  ex-
pected NCBT, PPMT, and TDEBTwere more
pronounced by year five of  the simulation when
the initial debt load was reduced and more land
was operated on a rental basis.
The levels of expected additional borrowing
reflect both declining farm profitability and the
financial advantages of adjusting the debt level
and renegotiating rental arrangements. The ad-
ditional  expected  borrowing  which  resulted
when  PPMT was  negative  (actual  term debt
payments  were not only less  than the  sched-
uled amortizations, but cash flows were so low
that additional borrowing was required to meet
other cash requirements)  was computed as an
additional indicator of downside financial risk
exposure.  Expected  additional  borrowing  in-
creased  from $21,900 to $55,100 by year five
in the high leverage situation, and from $16,300
to $42,300 with low initial debt under the fixed
cash rent  alternative.  The  corresponding  ex-
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Table  4.  Simulated  Financial  Performance  (in Year Five)  for  Two  Farm Ownership  Levels
and Rental Arrangements with Prepayment of Debt
Fixed Cash  Crop Share
NCOI  NCBT  PPMT  TDEBT  NCOI  NCBT  PPMT  TDEBT
............................................................ Model  860B($  thou-------------
Model 860B
Mean  93.7  -127.6  -24.3  1,060.5  98.7  -121.2  -18.5  1,047.5
S.V.a  3,454.2  11,290.7  6,347.1  118,165.0b  2,214.8  7,248.8  4,083.3  76,044.1b
Minimum  -89.0  -458.2  -272.4  155.4  -39.6  -371.6  -206.5  305.5
Maximum  249.7  153.6  185.7  2,130.6  227.1  109.7  153.6  1,858.4
Model 430B
Mean  72.3  -42.8  1.0  445.6  79.2  -35.3  8.1  435.1
S.V.a  3,388.2  11,029.4  6,168.9  114,665.0b  1,688.8  5,473.3  2,166.7  56,659.3b
Minimum  -106.0  -365.0  -240.4  -461.4  -40.4  -251.0  -153.3  -286.0
Maximum  228.0  238.3  211.3  1,486.4  203.2  188.4  175.3  1,131.0
a  Semivariance estimate for observations  below the mean, i.e.,  sum of squared negative deviations from the mean.
b Semivariance estimate  on term  debt is  the positive semivariance,  i.e.,  sum  of squared positive  deviations from  the mean.  Positive
semivariance  corresponds to the greater financial  risk at debt levels above the mean.
pected  borrowing  levels  in  year  five  were
$43,500 and $26,500 with crop share renting.
As  expected,  the  difference  in  expected  bor-
rowing associated with flexible and fixed rental
arrangements  is more pronounced when more
land is rented.
Conclusions
Financial risk relates the level of  fixed financial
obligations  through  borrowing  or  leasing  to
variability  of net  returns  at  the  whole-farm
level.  Strategic advantages were illustrated for
reductions  in the term debt load and  negoti-
ation of farmland leases to conserve cash flow
under risk.  The optimal farm plan which was
identified  using  a Target  MOTAD  program-
ming model reflected  risk reduction achieved
through traditional enterprise  diversification.
Two  financial  strategies  were  shown to ex-
tend the ability of the farm operator to manage
downside  risk beyond the singular effects  of a
diversified farm plan. Reductions in term debt
were shown to have a relatively greater impact
on farm financial performance, but a trade-off
between  debt level  and  use  of flexible  rental
arrangements  was observed.  The resulting  fi-
nancial  flexibility  provided  increased  protec-
tion  against adverse  economic  outcomes and
improved expected financial performance.  The
analysis  has  implications  for management  of
farm  financial stress where the objective is to
improve financial performance  and the ability
to service debt.
[Received October 1985; final revision
received February 1986.]
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